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ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT JUST
COMPENSATION: AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
Harry S. Gerla* & James Geoffrey Durham**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent article in the Minnesota Law Review,1 Professor James
Geoffrey Durham argued that there is presently no effective check on
the governmental use of eminent domain2 and that an effective check
would be to require the government to pay "efficient" just compensation for takings of private property by eminent domain.' Professor Durham's thesis is based on the assertions that the courts 4 are unwilling to
limit the use of eminent domain and that the electorate may not respond when elected officials have engaged in unjust and inefficient6 uses

* Associate Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Queens College (1970);
M.A., University of Florida (1972); J.D., Ohio State University (1975).
** Associate Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., University of California,
Berkeley (1973); J.D., University of California, Davis (1976).
1. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain,. 69 MINN. L. REV.
1277 (1985).
2. The assertion is based on the United States Supreme Court's determination of the meaning of the fifth amendment's requirements that the taking of private property must be for a "public use" and that the property owner must be paid "just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
The Supreme Court has determined that the public use requirement is "coterminous" with the
police power. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984). Professor
Durham argues that this essentially renders the public use limitation meaningless because rarely
will the courts hold that a governmental activity is beyond the police power. See Durham, supra
note I, at 1282-84.
The Supreme Court has also held that just compensation is the payment of market value for
the property taken. See, e.g.. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973). Professor Durham argues that this standard can result in inefficient and
unjust uses of eminent domain. See Durham, supra note I, at 1292-93.
3. See Durham, supra note I, at 1300-13. Professor Durham argues that efficient just compensation is achieved by forcing the government to internalize all those external costs which are
"large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable." Id. at 1302. Professor Durham contends that
the external costs which should be considered for all owners are "replacement of the land and
improvements taken; relocation, including moving costs, and the termination and startup costs of
utilites and other services; lost current business revenue; [and] lost business goodwill or value." Id.
at 1305 (footnotes omitted). He also contends that "the owner of residential property that is taken
by eminent domain suffers the additional demoralization cost of being required to abandon a
home." Id. at 1306. Professor Durham therefore contends that these "specific demoralization
costs" of homeowners should be part of the award of just compensation. Id.
4. The article focuses on the United States Supreme Court. The article recognizes that state
supreme courts can provide for different approaches to the ,questions of what constitutes "public
uses" and "just compensation." Id. at 1283-84 n.48.
5. Id. at 1300.
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of eminent domain.6 Professor Durham's response is to require, to the
extent possible, 7 governments to compensate owners whose properties
are taken by eminent domain for all the owners' costs which are "large,
fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable." 8
Such a thesis is bound to provoke responses critical of both the
premises of the thesis and the conclusions drawn from it. Following are
two essays, one by a critic of Professor Durham's thesis and the other a
response by Professor Durham. In the first essay, Professor Harry S.
Gerla, one of Professor Durham's colleagues, raises two broad concerns
about the impact of requiring efficient just -compensation for takings by
eminent domain. Professor Gerla's concerns revolve around the social
effect of forcing governments to internalize all costs of projects when it
may be difficult to monetize the benefits of those projects. Professor
Durham's essay responds by initially evaluating Professor Gerla's concerns within the economic model developed in Professor Durham's original article and then by dealing specifically with Professor Gerla's
concerns.
II.

GERLA: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF EFFICIENT JUST COMPENSATION

In a recent article in the Minnesota Law Review, my colleague,
Professor James Geoffrey Durham, argued that when governments take
property through the exercise of their power of eminent domain, the
traditional measure of compensation, the market value of the property,
is not only inadequate and unjust, but, economically inefficient. 9 Professor Durham proposed that governmental units be required to pay the
full costs of their takings by compensating property owners for items
such as relocation costs and "specific" demoralization costs."0
The idea that governments should be required to pay full "economically efficient" just compensation has a great deal of appeal. As
Professor Durham points out, to the extent that the market value of the
property taken does not reflect the social costs of the taking, the government is encouraged to engage in takings whose social costs outweigh
their benefits simply because the government does not have to bear at
least some of those costs." The tendency of governments to ignore the
costs of their takings is exacerbated when those costs must be borne by

6. Id. at 1293-1300.
7. Id. at 1304-11.
8. Id. at 1302. Professor Durham adopted this formulation of "externalities" from Judge
Stephen Breyer. Id. at 1279. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982).
9. Durham, supra note I.
10. Id. at 1304-10.
II. Id. at 1300-01.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/4

1986]

JUST COMPENSATION

groups who are politically powerless or unpopular.12 Proponents of the
view that legal rules ought to be aimed at maximizing wealth will, naturally, applaud a full compensation scbeme.' 3 Even those who argue
that legal rules ought to implement other goals will not necessarily be
offended by requiring governments to pay economically efficient just
compensation in eminent domain cases. A requirement that the government pay such compensation will not prevent the government from engaging in takings to implement needed projects, but will merely cause
the government to consider whether the projects are in fact needed and
whether they are really "worth the candle." In theory, an economically
efficient just compensation requirement seems to be an ideal policy.
Unfortunately, in the actual society in which we live, a requirement
that the government pay economically efficient just compensation is
likely to have hidden costs which should cause us to temper the enthusiasm with which we embrace the concept.
The most serious cost of economically efficient just compensation
is that it may cause governments to forego socially desirable projects
which are unpopular or produce only non-tangible or non-market benefits. Some of the projects which served as illustrations in Professor Durham's article shared neither of these characteristics. For example, when
the city of Detroit took the Poletown neighborhood for use as a site for
a General Motors plant, it was engaged in an action which would create benefits which were not only tangible, but monetizable as well. The
perceived economic benefits such as new jobs and increased tax revenues which flowed from the General Motors plant were easily measurable and readily appreciable.' 4 Moreover, any move which would preserve jobs in the economically depressed Detroit automobile industry
was likely to meet with popular approval. 5 Similarly, highways such as
the Cross-Bronx Expressway have obvious, tangible, and in some in-

12. Id. at 1296-97.
13. Cf. R. POSNER. THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) (arguing that wealth maximization
ought to be the goal of all legal rules).
14. Loss of the Cadillac and Fisher body plants would have cost the city of Detroit 6150
jobs at the two affected plants plus thousands of jobs in allied industries. Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 650-51, 304 N.W.2d 455, 467 (1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). The impact from the loss of employment is both tangible and monetizable. Indeed, the
loss of real estate and income tax revenues alone, two readily monetized quantities, was estimated
to run into the millions of dollars. Id.
15. At the time of the taking of'the Poletown neigborhood, the State of Michigan had an
unemployment rate of 14.2%. The unemployment rate for the city of Detroit was 18% (30% for
black citizens). Id. at 647, 304 N.W.2d at 465. Moreover, the automobile industry was under
seige from foreign competition, and many other industries were leaving the State of Michigan. Id.
Under these circumstances, the "crescendo of supportive applause" which greeted the project
should
be startling.1986
Id. at 659, 304 N.W.2d at 470-71.
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stances, marketable benefits for those who will make use of them."
Many government projects, however, lack tangible, monetizable, or
marketable benefits. Even to the extent that such projects have tangible
benefits, they often dedicate them to groups which are ignored or unpopular, or diffuse them so widely throughout society that their impact
is minor with respect to any particular individual.
Prisons and mental hospitals are examples of projects which, at
least in the short run, all tend to lack a marketable tangible benefit. A
simple shorthand way of describing them would be to call them "unpopular projects."'1 7 Whatever benefits unpopular projects havehonoring human dignity, reducing crime, or increasing the enjoyment
of deprived youngsters-are generally evident only in the long run and
have no readily ascertainable market value. Moreover, those benefits
are often given to groups our society dislikes or would rather ignore,
such as criminals, the poor, and the mentally ill. A requirement that
the government pay economically efficient just compensation for property taken for such projects would unduly prejudice governments from
undertaking the unpopular project. The reason governments would be
biased against such projects is that governmental decision makers, like
other human beings, tend to overweigh tangible benefits and underweigh intangible benefits.' 6
The concept of fiscal illusion, which is discussed by Professor Durham in his article, is one of the manifestations of the prejudice for
tangible benefits over intangible ones. As Professor Durham points out,
fiscal illusion is the tendency of governments to ignore costs unless they
are reflected in the budget. 19 A requirement that economically efficient
just compensation be paid in eminent domain cases will create a type of
fiscal illusion with respect to unpopular projects. Implementation of an
economically efficient just compensation rule will, by definition, require
governmental decision makers to pay more for property they take in
carrying out needed projects, whether popular or unpopular. In the case
of popular projects, the additional increment of compensation will be

16. The benefits of convenience and time saved through the use of new roads are, of course,
tangible. The benefits of the roads are sometimes marketed and monetized through the imposition
of tolls on motorists using the highway. Cf THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1976, at
121 (listing U.S. toll roads).
17. When this essay uses the term "unpopular project," it does not necessarily imply that
the general public actively disapproves of it. The term is merely used to connote those projects
whose benefits are intangible or diffuse but whose costs fall on a discrete group whose members
are often vocal in their opposition to the projects because of their highly concentrated costs.
18. Cf. E. QUADE. ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS 372 (1975) (noting that the common
pitfall of policy analysis is the substitution of inappropriate measurable quantity for intangible
goal).
19. See Durham, supra note 1,at 1297.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/4
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balanced against tangible, monetizable, and sometimes marketable
benefits. In the case of the unpopular project, the concrete compensation must be balanced against intangible, nonmonetizable benefits frequently going to despised or forgotten groups. Given the human tendency to overweigh tangible benefits and costs and to underweigh
intangible benefits and costs, the extra monetary outlays occasioned by
an efficient just compensation principle will be given undue weight in
comparison with the intangible benefits produced by the unpopular project. Governments may forego socially desirable projects because governmental decision makers place too much emphasis on the immediately obvious increased monetary costs occasioned by economically
efficient just compensation.
Besides inducing government officials to eschew unpopular
projects, a principle of economically efficient just compensation may
produce another detriment, albeit a subtle and perhaps vague
one-increasing the unwillingness of citizens to make sacrifices for the
good of their community. Social commentators from across the political
spectrum have decried what they view as a rising spirit of selfishness in
contemporary American society.2 0 One of the manifestations of this
spirit is a decline in what some commentators have called civic virtue,
the willingness to put the interests of one's community ahead of one's
immediate self-interest."
A rule of economically efficient just compensation contributes to
the decline of civic virtue by suggesting to those compensated that they
need not make personal sacrifices for the good of the community. Of
course, no one other than a totalitarian would argue that individuals
always ought to be required to subordinate their self-interest to that of
the community. I do not mean to suggest that the fifth amendment's
just compensation clause and its state counterparts be repealed in the
name of civic virtue. What I am suggesting is that to the extent a difference between the current measure of just compensation, market
value, and economically efficient just compensation exists, that difference ought to be regarded as part of the price citizens must pay for a
civilized society. As Justice Holmes stated in a somewhat different context, "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." 2 2
One can agree that citizens ought to be required to make sacrifices
20.

See, e.g., R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF
284-90 (1985); A. HACKER, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA 136-38, 142 (1970); G.
WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT 159-60 (1983).
21. G. WILL, supra note 20, at 134.
22. eCommons,
Pennsylvania 1986
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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for their community but challenge why owners whose property is taken
through eminent domain should be singled out for the "privilege" of
making special sacrifices. I suppose the only answer to such a challenge
is to admit that the practicalities of governing sometimes require persons to make unequal sacrifices because they possess skills, attributes,
resources, or property which the government needs and which other citizens do not possess. For example, when this country had compulsory
selective service, young males were called upon to make sacrifices
3
which females and older individuals were not called upon to make.
Under the current progressive federal income tax system, individuals
with higher incomes are theoretically supposed to make greater sacrifices than those with lower incomes. 4 In an area more closely akin to
eminent domain, most governmental regulatory takings involve unequal
sacrifices on the part of individuals. For example, a decision by the
government to place a halfway house for former prison inmates next to
my house will certainly diminish my property's value more than that of
someone living four miles away at the other end of the city. Persons
whose property is taken through eminent domain are, in effect, called
upon to make the unequal sacrifice of any difference between market
value and economically efficient just compensation because it is their
property which the presumably democratically elected government has
decided is needed for a public project.
In spite of the costs of economically efficient just compensation, I
do not necessarily suggest that adoption of the principle is per se a bad
idea. Indeed, as I suggested at the beginning of this essay, the principle
"5
of economically efficient compensation has many attractions. All I
wish to propose is that we pause to consider the practical and moral
costs of economically efficient compensation before we rush to embrace
the idea. Perhaps the costs are not significant or are avoidable. Until
those costs are, however, dealt with, economically efficient just compensation will remain an attractive but seriously flawed approach to how
much compensation the government must provide when exercising its
power of eminent domain.
III.

DURHAM: JUST COMPENSATION, FISCAL ILLUSION, AND CIVIC
VIRTUE

In the preceding essay, my colleague, Harry S. Gerla, has raised
some troubling concerns about the concept of efficient just compensa-

23. Cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding selective service registration
requirement applying only to males against fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge).
24. Cf.26 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 11 1984) (establishing graduated income tax rates).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/4
25. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
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tion which I advanced in my article Efficient Just Compensation asa
Limit on Eminent Domain.2 6 His concerns, from my reading of his essay, center on what I will call social values. First, he perceives that
efficient just compensation, by forcing governmental officials to consider all the costs of a project, will foster fiscal illusion thereby allowing, or worse yet compelling, those officials to ignore the benefits of
some worthwhile projects. Further, Professor Gerla perceives a decline
in civic virtue, in the form of increased selfishness, as a result of mandating that a citizen whose property is taken for a governmental project
receive full compensation for his loss. I would first like to address what
I perceive as a fundamental difference between Professor Gerla's approach and mine, and then directly respond to his concerns about fiscal
illusion and civic virtue.
A.

Two Views 'of Efficient Just Compensation

Professor Gerla and I appear to be approaching the just compensation issue from different perspectives.17 My article essentially takes a
micro approach to the problem of just compensation-my approach is
to look at individual takings and the impact on them of requiring efficient just compensation. Although Professor Gerla's essay evidences
some concern about individual transactions (his fiscal illusion argument), on the whole he takes a macro approach to the problem of just
compensation; the primary thrust of his criticisms seem to be that social values will be ignored (also his fiscal illusion argument) or eroded
(his civic virtue argument). Our differences may not arise so much
from economic considerations as from different views of the political
and social world. At least when it comes to eminent domain, Professor
Gerla seems to place a greater initial emphasis on the society in general. My initial emphasis, however, is on the individual who is the target of the governmental action. Neither of us appears to limit his focus,
but we start from different perspectives.
One's starting point does matter. For example, one of the principal
points in my thesis is cost internalization, which necessarily leads one
to a micro analysis. My contention is that if the costs of eminent domain are internalized by government, government should engage in eminent domain only if the project is efficient, that is whenever the pro-

26. Durham, supra note 1.
27. To say "appear" is somewhat of a misstatement, although a necessary one. For anyone
reading my original article and these essays, "appear" is the appropriate characterization. However, Professor Gerla and I have, over the last two years, discussed at length problems with the
current law of eminent domain; I acknowledged the helpfulness of his criticisms and suggestions in
the author's note of my original article. Id. To Professor Gerla and me, therefore, the differences
between us do not just "'appear" to be present but are quite real and identifiable.
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ject's benefits exceed its costs. Efficient just compensation provides a
check on the use of eminent domain in individual cases and, residually,
a check on government in general, at least when government needs to
acquire private property to carry out its programs. Therefore, the micro
approach has a macro benefit.
Professor Gerla begins with a macro approach. He is concerned
overall about socially beneficial, but perhaps unpopular, projects and a
decline in civic virtue. He begins his analysis by focusing on macro
costs, which is the weakness of his approach. He has accepted the
micro benefits of my model, but he has ignored the macro benefits. The
first step in evaluating any costs of efficient just compensation is to
evaluate any perceived costs within the micro model used to justify the
payment of efficient just compensation in the first place.
Both of Professor Gerla's concerns can be evaluated within the
model established in my article. The model established a framework for
determining which external costs of eminent domain would have to be
internalized by government. I argued that those costs should be any
externalities, or those external costs which are "large, fairly concrete,
and roughly monetizable." 2 8 I agree with Professor Gerla that the costs
of fiscal illusion can be large, and I am willing to concede for purposes
of discussion that a loss of civic virtue may have a large cost.2 9 I have
greater trouble describing either of them as "fairly concrete" or
"roughly monetizable." Professor Gerla, of course, concedes this by
saying, in relation to fiscal illusion, that "[m]any government projects,
however, lack tangible, monetizable, or marketable benefits."" 0 In relation to civic virtue, he states that it is a "subtle and perhaps vague"
detriment.3 1 Therefore, in terms of a micro analysis, Professor Gerla's
concerns would have to be excluded.3 2
The point of this discussion of Professor Gerla's concerns about
social values is not to say that because they cannot be internalized they
do not exist; to the contrary, what separates my article from a "Chicago" approach is that I am willing to consider values which are difficult to monetize. 3 Social values do exist, and they must be considered.

28.
Id. at 1301-02. See S. BREYER, supra note 8, at 23.
29. This is not a grudging concession. I too am worried about civic virtue. However, unlike
fiscal illusion, which is at least comprehendible in neutral terms, civic virtue is so value laden a
term that it may be impossible to even identify what it is, much less approximate its importance in
order to estimate the costs of its lessening or loss.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
32. As an aside, my article also identified several costs that had to be excluded from my
analysis. I excluded general demoralization costs resulting from takings and demoralization costs
specific to business property owners. See Durham, supra note I, at 1306-10.
33. For example, in my article I propose that the transaction costs of efficient just compenhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/4
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What Professor Gerla has ignored, however, is that once we move onto
such a general plane we must consider not only the macro costs he
asserts result from the micro analysis of just compensation, but we
must also consider the macro benefits generated by efficient just compensation. There are several benefits, and I propose that they counterbalance or exceed the costs of efficient just compensation.
B.

Fiscal Illusion

Fiscal illusion is a significant problem in eminent domain. Fiscal
illusion is usually used to describe the situation in which a government
underestimates costs for which it is not responsible.3 4 My article recognizes and deals with fiscal illusion by asserting that governments should
have to internalize the externalities of their eminent domain actions.3 5
Professor Gerla's use of fiscal illusion to describe government's underestimation of the benefits of a politically unpopular project is a fair
adaptation of the term. Just as one will be unlikely to acknowledge
nonbudgetary costs which will force him to abandon a politically popular position, so, it seems, he will be unlikely to acknowledge
nonbudgetary benefits that will force him to take a politically unpopular position.
Any costs of fiscal illusion should, however, be Offset by the benefits of efficient just compensation: (1) government is held accountable
for its direct actions against its citizens and (2) people should perceive
that eminent domain actions are just or fair because a citizen does receive compensation for all his costs when the government takes his
property. Both of these points are central to my article.
Government should not, as the United States Supreme Court is
allowing, be able to arbitrarily take an owner's property without having
to account for the taking except for having to pay market value to the
owner.36 A check on the governmental use of eminent domain must be
created, and efficient just compensation will provide that check. While
I acknowledge that it is impossible to monetize this benefit, it seems to
be a benefit that fulfills a basic tenet of a democratic society.
Second, requiring efficient just compensation should have a "moralization" benefit in that the citizenry will perceive that despite the fact
sation (primarily any increased costs of bargaining and litigation that would be avoided with a
lesser measure of just compensation) are offset "by the inequity of burdening the property owners
with costs that the public should bear and by the need to find some judicial limit to replace the
ineffectual political check." Id. at 1306.
34. Id. at 1300-01. See also Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 620 (1984); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977).
35. See Durham, supra note 1, at 1300-01.
Published36.
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that a particular owner or group of owners has been singled out, they
at least have been compensated as well as can be expected. Indeed, as
37
Professor Gerla suggests, we all must give for the common good. But
it seems to me that an owner whose land has been taken has given
enough by having to change his business or his life, without having to
bear identifiable monetary costs as well. Any public project should have
a specific moralization benefit, and requiring efficient just compensation
should make it more likely that governmental projects as a whole are
perceived as having greater benefits than costs, thereby providing a
general moralization benefit to all governmental projects requiring the
use of eminent domain.
C. Civic Virtue
Professor Gerla's concern about a diminishing or loss of civic virtue also has merit, but I would argue that efficient just compensation
furthers civic virtue rather than diminishes it. As I just pointed out,
one of the advantages of efficient just compensation is the moralization
benefit gained by avoiding fiscal illusion and forcing governments to
account for the costs of their projects rather than arbitrarily assigning
them to individual citizens. This moralization benefit should further
civic virtue because each citizen will know that he will be called upon
to make sacrifices only when others in his situation are similarly called.
Civic virtue should flourish when citizens perceive that all, or at least
all in similar situations, are called upon to sacrifice for the common
good.
Professor Gerla uses two examples which bolster my point quite
well. First, compulsory selective service is indeed an example of individual sacrifice for the common good for which the burden falls on an
identifiable group, namely young men.38 Nonetheless, the draft became
extremely unpopular during the Vietnam War, 39 undoubtedly partly
because it was an unpopular war,'4 0 but also because the draft was
viewed as discriminatory. Those inducted into military service tended
to be racial minorities, the poor, and the uneducated.4 1 Civic virtue
floundered, at least in part, because the sacrifice was not perceived as
being justly distributed.
Second, Professor Gerla raises the progressive income tax as an
example of a greater sacrifice imposed upon an identifiable group,

See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
See B. SCOWCROFT, MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1982).
S. KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 546-48 (1983).
41. T. REEVES & K. HESS, THE END OF THE DRAFT 69, 74 (1970).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/4
37.
38.
39.
40.
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namely the wealthy. 42 The progressive income tax is, in its pure form, a
perfect example of group sacrifice for the common good and of civic
virtue: the wealthy have more so they are expected to give more to the
common good. Professor Gerla recognizes, however, that the progressive income tax system works only theoretically; the wealthy, on balance, pay proportionately less than the middle class. 43 Further, it appears that the ability of the wealthy to avoid paying their "fair share"
of taxes results in greater incidences of tax fraud and failure to file tax
returns.44 Again, civic virtue flounders because the sacrifice is not perceived as being justly distributed.
Professor Gerla also uses an example of a regulation which imposes costs on identifiable individual citizens-locating a halfway house
for former prison inmates in a residential neighborhood. 41 There can
appear to be little difference between the effect of a regulation and a
taking by eminent domain, but the ultimate impact is quite different.
With eminent domain, the government will become the owner of the
previously privately owned property. If the process by which the government obtains ownership is not perceived as just, civic virtue is diminished; the focus is on the "one on one" contest between the government and a private citizen. With the regulation, a broader political
question exists because the zoning regulation which will allow a halfway house in a particular neighborhood should apply to other similar
neighborhoods. The adoption of the new zoning regulation should have
greater political interest than the selection of one particular site for a
new governmental project. Indeed, once a particular house is selected
for the halfway house, the neighbors are affected, but they still own
their property. Further, although there may only be one halfway house
in a city, several neighborhoods should be zoned to allow for more, and
there is the possibility that in the future there will be other halfway
houses. Finally, the halfway house may close, and the risk of loss or
benefit from potentially temporary or changing governmental action is
quite different in its impact on civic virtue than the permanent taking
of one's property.
D. Conclusion
Professor Gerla has raised two important concerns about any governmental action, but each applies differently to efficient just compensation. Fiscal illusion is a problem in efficient just compensation, but it

42.
43.
44.

See supra text accompanying note 24.
S. MAITAL. MINDS. MARKETS. & MONEY 244-46 (1982).

Id. at 244-49.

45.bySupra
text accompanying
notes 24-25.
Published
eCommons,
1986

56

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

12:1

seems to me that the benefits of efficient just compensation outweigh
the costs of emphasizing the monetary costs of unpopular projects. As
to civic virtue, Professor Gerla and I plainly disagree. Efficient just
compensation should futher civic virtue. By requiring the payment of
efficient just compensation, government will be perceived as justly dealing with its citizens. Individuals should be more willing to make sacrifices if they perceive that others similar to them are asked to make
similar sacrifices.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/4

